

Not letting ‘bad apples’ spoil the bunch: Democratization and strict international organization accession rules

Christodoulos Kaoutzanis¹ · Paul Poast² ·
Johannes Urpelainen³

Published online: 7 October 2015

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Abstract To solve their domestic and international problems, democratizing states often form new international organizations. In doing so, they face the question of institutional design: what types of rules and provisions should be included in the charter of the new international organization? We analyze this question through the lens of accession rules, with an emphasis on voting rules. We argue that democratizing states have strong incentives to design organizations with strict accession rules. Organizations with strict accession rules allow the founding members to regulate entry. This is particularly useful for transitional democracies, as democratizing states are initially unable to gain entry into the lucrative existing international organizations operated by the established democracies. Using original data on accession voting rules in 324 international organizations, we find strong evidence in support of our claims.

Keywords Democratization · International organization · Voting rules · Accession criteria

1 Introduction

Accession rules are central to the relationship between democratization and international organization (IO) membership. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) maintain that democratizing states seek to join IOs with the strictest membership criteria, as the conditions

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s11558-015-9237-5) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

✉ Paul Poast
paulpoast@uchicago.edu

¹ Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA

² Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, USA

³ Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA

imposed on candidates seeking IO membership enable democratizing states to signal their commitment to domestic reforms. However, democratizing states are often not able to join established IOs due precisely to an inability to meet the strict conditions associated with membership. As Poast and Urpelainen (2013, 831) write, “while some existing IOs promise lucrative benefits, joining these existing IOs is often not feasible for democratizing states... Established democracies may hesitate to allow democratizing states to join the most lucrative existing IOs”. Finding themselves shut out of the most lucrative existing IOs, democratizing states have little recourse but to band together and form their own IOs. While these new IOs, such as BALTBAT and CEFTA, might lack the resources of the established IOs, such as NATO and the EU, they can help democratizing states coordinate policies, pool resources, and cooperate in a manner that supports democratization and paves the way for future membership in the existing IOs.

Democratizing states forming a new IO are not required to meet any of its accession criteria, as these criteria are only applicable to states joining an IO after its formation. As a result, the choice of accession rules in designing an IO cannot be explained by a credible commitment argument. And yet, while democratizing states will not be subject to the accession rules of their newly formed IO, writing accession rules for these new IOs is not without purpose. These rules will be imposed on other, future members. What accession criteria do democratizing states use to regulate the future membership in their newly formed IOs?

We argue that democratizing states will create new IOs with strict accession rules. IOs with strict accession rules enable the democratizing states to set policies that facilitate their path towards democratic consolidation, because strict accession rules reduce the probability that countries who could undermine their democratization efforts will later join the organization. Unlike a simple agreement, an IO is a forum for future decisions. Insincere members can wreak havoc by blocking important decisions on future cooperation even if the organization has institutionalized mechanisms to enforce cooperation. As Kydd (2001, 801) writes, these accession criteria “separate states who are seriously interested in cooperation from those who have more exploitive motivations.” Indeed, this sentiment was voiced explicitly in 1992 by Czechoslovakia’s President Vaclav Havel in reference to Ukraine possibly joining an association with the democratizing countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, “[t]he expansion of the Visegrad Three with such countries would necessarily lead to the reduced efficiency of our existing cooperation.”¹

To test the argument, we collect data on the accession rules of over 300 IOs in existence from 1965 to 2000. Our analysis places particular emphasis on *voting rules*: the number of existing members that must approve a candidate’s accession. Voting rules are perhaps the most important barrier to accession. To emphasize the importance of voting rules, even in cases that do not pertain to democracy, consider Slovenia’s accession to the European Union. Despite having one of the most advanced economies of the enlargement candidates, Slovenia’s accession to the EU stalled in the early 1990s due to Italian intransigence (Schneider and Urpelainen 2012). Though it signed a treaty to the contrary, Italy insisted on the return of expropriated property and, consequently,

¹ “Three Visegrad Leaders Discuss Ties,” 14 March 1992, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Europe (hereafter, FBIS-EEU) 25. March 1992: 2–3.

vetoed negotiations on the accession agreement.² Slovenia's accession could only proceed after Italy was satisfied with Slovenia's steps to rectify the dispute. Voting rules, in effect, capture a key element of "informal governance" (Steinberg 2002; Stone 2011). From the OECD to the WTO, despite various conditions being placed on membership, the only condition that ultimately matters is whether a sufficient number of existing members deem the candidate worthy of accession (Davis and Wilf 2012; Davis 2013). Moreover, as we explain below, while explicit policy requirements are rare and geographic restrictions largely reflect the regional foci of organizations, there is much variation in voting criteria for future accessions. The results from the analysis support our theory. Democratization more than doubles the probability that a state forms an IO with strict voting rules, and the effect is statistically significant.

This study brings together two important literatures, one focusing on the IO-democratization relationship (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Moravcsik 2000; Poast and Urpelainen 2013) and the other on institutional design (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Koremenos et al. 2001). Though scholars of institutional design have largely focused on international cooperation problems and students of democratization mostly neglect institutional design, our findings suggest that the two cannot be disentangled. Scholars of institutional design should consider the domestic context of design, and the literature on democratization can gain from investigating issues of institutional design at the international level. By addressing the issue of institutional design through the lens of accession rules, this study shows that accession rules allow democratizing states to create exclusive clubs for the governance of their domestic transition. The new IOs created by transitional democracies allow the governments of these countries to pursue their goals of political survival and, ultimately, democratic consolidation.

2 Democratization and the choice of accession rules for IOs

Scholars of international relations argue that democratization enhances a state's proclivity to gain IO membership (Whitehead 1996; Moravcsik 2000; Pevehouse 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008). The basis for this argument is the idea that democratization creates a need for the government to credibly commit to new policies that improve the economy and that supply public goods to the electorate. IOs can provide the resources needed to accomplish both objectives. But if the IO imposes conditions on acquiring and maintaining membership, then this constrains policy formulation. Hence, leaders in democratizing states can use the allure of achieving and maintaining IO membership as a commitment mechanism.

Poast and Urpelainen (2013) add an important caveat to this theory: while democratizing states might seek membership in IOs, they will be largely interested in forming their own, new IOs. This is for several reasons. First, their ability to join the most lucrative existing IOs, such as NATO or the EU, is severely constrained. Such IOs impose costly entrance criteria that can impede accession for years. If an existing IO can enforce policy commitments, it can also extract concessions for membership. This means that while the established IO might "fit" the needs of the democratizing state,

² In doing so, Italy argued that Slovenian legislation on the purchase of land by foreigners was not in line with EU law.

becoming a member is often not “feasible.” Second, many established IOs were not designed for the unique challenges facing democratizing states. Given the “stickiness” of organizational mandates (March and Olsen 1998), the needs facing the original members of existing IOs likely still dominate the policy orientation of those IOs. Given that democratizing states originate from a variety of regions (from Eastern Europe to Latin America) and emanate from a variety of contexts (from internal revolutions to decolonization), it is unlikely that existing IOs will “fit” the needs of the newly democratizing state. Third, there is simply a dearth of viable IOs in some regions. This is especially the case in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (Poast and Urpelainen 2013, 835).

The alternative for democratizing states is to form their own IOs, and this they have done. Democratizing countries can design IOs to achieve their political and economic goals, which are mainly defined by the need to govern their democratic transition (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). As democratizing countries design their IOs, their main interest is in the management of their transition toward democratic consolidation. Democratization increases the demand for public goods, broadly defined as policies that benefit broad constituencies in the society (such as environmental protection, combating corruption, building public infrastructure, and providing internal and external security). Since non-democratic countries have little need for capacity building to improve the provision of public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Wintrobe 1998), democratization leaves the new regime with a difficult challenge: it must face high expectations for public good provision, but without an administrative apparatus experienced in doing so (Haggard and Kaufman 1997). IOs can enable public good provision by making up for the inadequacies of the domestic institutions inherited by the democratizing government (Abbott and Snidal 2010; Mattli and Plümper 2004; Schimmelfennig 2005; Shaffer 2005; VanDeveer and Dabelko 2001). Newly created IOs are designed by democratizing states to address their unique governance problems, to coordinate policies amongst the group of democratizing states, and to pool the limited resources of the group of democratizing states.³

Democratizing states will not want just any state to become a member of their newly formed IOs. “Bad apples” are states who, as members, will not support the IOs ability to provide for the needs of the democratizing states or, at worst, could actually undercut the ability of the new IO to provide for the needs of the democratizing states.⁴ For example, if cooperation within an IO is to focus on the challenges that transitional democracies face, it is important to prevent authoritarian states with a strong interest in

³ Newly created IOs also provide a low cost avenue through which “sponsoring” established democracies can supply resources or advice. For example, when they began the process of democratization, the Baltic states formed the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) in 1994. Besides providing a mechanism by which they could coordinate defense policies and pool their limited materials, many Nordic countries provided basic military equipment and training in civil military relations (Ito 2013). Contributing to BALTBAT was low cost to the established democracies because (1) the established democracies were not fully responsible for designing BALTBAT and (2) the advice and resources were not to the level of that offered to a country joining an IO, such as NATO, to which some of the Nordic democracies were already a members. But while the resources and advice might have been of a lesser quality, they were of immense value to the democratizing states (who require all forms of technical and material assistance).

⁴ Joining the newly created IO can be attractive from the perspective of the “bad apples”. The new IO can influence a host of policies, such as regional security and trade cooperation. The efforts by the democratizing states to cooperate on these policies will produce externalities that influence non-members. Hence, non-members will wish to have a say over these policies.

anti-democratic machinations from joining the IO. Such states may impede transitional democracies from interacting with one another or with established democracies seeking to support the consolidation of democratic rule in their younger, transitional counterparts. Also, since IOs are decision making institutions, it is important for the democratizing states to block the membership of states who will undermine the IOs coordination of policies or provision of public goods.⁵

To accomplish this objective, democratizing states will place strict accession rules in their newly created IOs. As founding members, democratizing states do not have to abide by these strict criteria. Yet, strict accession rules restrict future entry to an IO. Including restrictive criteria in the new IO can prevent states with a questionable desire to support the task of democratization from joining that IO. In contrast, though lax accession rules enable rapid membership growth, the original members cannot easily maintain their influence within the IO. If membership is easy to attain, states of all kinds, including “bad apples”, could join the IO. Because newly created IOs serve the specific needs of democratizing states, it is critical that any subsequent members support the IO’s ability to provide for those needs.

Ultimately, what constitutes a “bad apple” is a matter of perception: the newly democratizing states wish to have the ability to prevent membership of countries they fear will dilute their co-operative efforts. Indeed, sometimes a “bad apple” can be another democratizing state. On the one hand, one might expect that democratizing states will have rather homogenous preferences: all seek to enact policies that can help consolidate democratic rule. On the other hand, democratizing regimes are highly unstable. Given that the regime emerged from a transition, leaders in democratizing states operate under the shadow of a reversal back to autocracy. This gives leaders in transitional regimes acute time-inconsistency problems (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008, 271). As a result, while the states might have common interests at one moment, that could quickly change. Hence, states will want to ensure that democratizing members of the new IO are those who are least likely to experience an autocratic reversal.

To make clear our argument, consider a few examples. In the early 1990s, the domestic economies of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia faced immense difficulties with economic restructuring (Rudka and Mizsei 1994, 16). To assist their transitions, the so-called “Visegrad Triangle” created the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). The Visegrad countries used strict accession rules to regulate entry of future members into CEFTA, as embodied in Article 49 of the agreement: “Accession to this Agreement may take place with the consent of all Parties. Terms and conditions of the accession shall be determined in an accession agreement concluded between all the Parties to this Agreement on one side and the acceding Party on the other side.”⁶ This rule enabled the CEFTA founders to block the entry of undesirable candidates, in this case Ukraine. In a May 1992 press conference, Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, in reference to Ukraine’s desire to join the organization, remarked, “Ukraine should be able to join the world and the European countries through

⁵ As Downs et al. (1998) argue, the deepening of cooperation in an IO will slow as less and less enthusiastic states join. But see Gilligan (2004) for why the broader-deeper trade-off does not exist for all kinds of organizations and treaties.

⁶ “The Agreement on Amendment of and Agreement to the Central European Free Trade Agreement.” Available at <http://www.cefta.int>. Accessed on November 5, 2014.

various channels. However, I do not think it would be expedient to include Ukraine [in an association with the Visegrad countries].”⁷ As elaborated by Czechoslovakian President Jozsef Havel, “Other countries, like Ukraine, are in a slightly different situation [than the Visegrad countries], and they are in a different development phase. The expansion of the Visegrad Three with such countries would necessarily lead to the reduced efficiency of our existing cooperation.”⁸

In another example, the founding members of the South African Development Community (SADC) faced precisely the danger of dilution if South Africa became a member. The SADC was established to replace the more narrowly focused Development Coordination Conference (DDC), whose members had been ruled by non-white regimes for a number of years and had actively opposed apartheid and non-majority rule in South Africa (Prunier 2008). In 1992, seven of the SADC’s 13 original members were undergoing democratic transitions. At the same time, while South Africa had abolished its apartheid laws, it was not scheduled to have democratic elections until 1994. Until elections were held, the democratizing SADC members could not trust that the white government of South Africa – with its history of intervention in their domestic affairs – would respect their internal democratic transitions. While desiring to consolidate trade cooperation through the SADC, the SADC members “urged South Africa to speed its transition from white rule to democracy, which they set as the condition for South Africa’s membership in their community” (The Globe and Mail 1992). By avoiding lax accession rules, these countries insured that their goals would not be thwarted or impeded by renegade South African membership.

In a third example, Mercosur was formed by four democratizing states in 1991: Argentina (which became a democracy in 1983), Brazil (which became a democracy in 1985), Uruguay (which became a democracy in 1985), and Paraguay (which became a democracy in 1992, but was moving towards democratization in 1991).⁹ Article 20 of The Treaty of Asunción states how Mercosur is open to accession “through negotiations”, but “[a]pproval of applications shall require the unanimous decision of the States Parties.”¹⁰ This proved critical when Venezuela sought membership. Gardini (2010, 191) writes how the members, particularly Paraguay and Brazil, faced a dilemma of “whether to accept Venezuela in the club to exercise stricter control over its initiatives or to keep it on hold lest it should jeopardize Mercosur’s unity and direction.” While Brazil finally agreed, Paraguay continued to block Venezuela’s membership. It was only after Paraguay was suspended for a year (following a controversial decision by the Paraguayan parliament to impeach the President) that Venezuela’s accession was approved. Hugo Chavez, then Venezuelan president, drew on a football analogy when describing Venezuela’s accession: “Suppose that in a football match, Pelé gets a red card for a foul. And then Brazil can’t score the goals it needs to win. And someone

⁷ “Three Visegrad Leaders Discuss Ties,” 14 March 1992, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Europe (hereafter, FBIS-EEU) 25. March 1992: 2–3.

⁸ “Three Visegrad Leaders Discuss Ties,” 14 March 1992, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Europe (hereafter, FBIS-EEU) 25. March 1992: 2–3.

⁹ Democracy designations based on when country achieved a Polity IV score of 6 or above.

¹⁰ English translation of treaty text available at <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/document.php?id=fta/agreements/mercosurfta.pdf>. Accessed on April 30, 2015.

says: ‘But Pelé wasn’t playing.’ Well, Pelé was suspended. Paraguay is suspended, it’s not currently part of Mercosur.”¹¹

The above discussion leads to our our main hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 *Democratization has a positive effect on the probability that a country forms a new IO with strict accession rules.*

To gain a deeper insight into the motivations for including strict voting accession rules, consider the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In the aftermath of World War II, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg, along with the democratizing states of Italy and West Germany (the ‘Common Six’), created the ECSC in 1951. In creating this IO, the Common Six chose to regulate accession rules with strict voting requirements. Specifically, Article 98 of the ECSC Treaty allows “[a]ny European State [to] request to accede to the present Treaty.”¹² Such states “shall address its request to the Council, which shall act by unanimous vote after having obtained the opinion of the High Authority. Also by a unanimous vote, the Council shall fix the terms of accession.”

To explain the existence of these strict accession rules, consider the political incentives behind the creation of the ECSC. While the main goal behind the creation of the ECSC was the integration of Western Europe with a view of avoiding another war, the mechanisms through which this goal was to come about mirror our arguments. Before the creation of the ECSC, when the market in coal and steel had been divided into national jurisdictions, the entire chain of manufacturing production was placed in a sub-optimal and often unpredictable position. By regulating the production and sale of coal and steel through a supra-national body (i.e. the Commission), the Common Six aimed to give up their powers to regulate the market of these products and prioritize their own domestic concerns in favor of a more constant and consistent supply chain (Reuter 1953). In doing so, the Common Six coordinated their policies on coal and steel and pooled their resources.

In coordinating these policies, this new IO could have important domestic political repercussions in its member-states. While the Common Six desired to liberalize the markets of coal and steel as a means for achieving more stable industrial production of their manufactured products, they were afraid that a future accession could disrupt the redistributive balance of the envisioned coal and steel production, and the “*équilibres d’intérêts...qui sont sous-jacents*” (Reuter 1953, 127).¹³ The main fear was that East Germany would accede to the ECSC through a reunification with Western Germany. The most vivid illustration of this fear appeared in the debate over the ratification of the ECSC treaty in the French parliament. There, various parliamentarians, including Michel Debré, former prime minister and one of the founders of the Fifth Republic, expressed fears over the possible accession of East Germany into the ECSC (Conseil de la République 1952). Debré, for example, claimed, “[i]f East Germany enters, after a unification with West Germany, into the European Community of Steel and Coal, the economic and political equilibrium of this community risks being drastically affected” (Conseil de la République 1952, 817). Such a step would give German coal and steel a

¹¹ Quoted in “The Expansion of Mercosur” The Economist August 3, 2012. Available at <http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2012/08/expansion-mercotur>. Accessed on April 28, 2015.

¹² Treaty text available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Treaty%20constituting%20the%20European%20Coal%20and%20Steel%20Community.pdf>.

¹³ Translated as “The underlying balance of interests”.

predominant position in the common market, thereby pricing out the less competitive small French producers. In answering such skeptics, Robert Schuman – the French foreign minister and one of the principal architects of the ECSC – reassured the French legislature that, “such a connection of the two German zones, such an accession....of East Germany into the [ECSC] would have to take place through Article 98 of the treaty, which controls how a state can demand to become a member of the community” (Conseil de la Republique 1952, 812). Schuman went on to highlight that before any accession, each national parliament of the Common Six would have to vote in favor of the accession of an applicant state (Conseil de la Republique 1952). Through this step, the members of the national legislatures – who represent those with the most to lose from a redistribution in the production of coal and steel – could verify that the terms of an accession would cushion its impact on the domestic economy of the founders (Scuppa 1955–1956)

The Common Six were also concerned over the possible accession of the United Kingdom.¹⁴ Through the ECSC, the Common Six pooled their resources by creating a series of powerful institutions at the European level (a Council, a Commission, a Court of Justice, and a Parliament). The effectiveness of these institutions could be undermined by the accession of the UK (Camps 1959). Not only did the UK have a vibrant manufacturing sector that could affect the market of the Common Six (Vignes 1956), but it had also strongly opposed the supra-national character of the ECSC during the negotiations for its formation and refused to sign the final treaty (Meyer 1960; Camps 1960). Instead, the UK preferred a customs union. The Common Six feared that if the UK would later enter the ECSC, it could dilute the effectiveness of the ECSC’s institutions, to which it explicitly refused to contribute in 1951 (Camps 1959). By requiring the affirmative vote of each ECSC member, the ECSC Treaty protected each of the Common Six and the ECSC from such developments.

As a result, the strict voting rules of Article 98 assuaged two main concerns of the Common Six: how to protect their domestic coal and steel constituencies and how to avoid dilution of their investment in the supra-national institutions. These provisions were intended to protect the ECSC from the accession of East Germany and the UK, and to allow the Common Six to flourish without war. The success of these accession rules is reflected in their continued use by the EU today.

3 Research design

To empirically evaluate our hypothesis, the unit of analysis for our tests is the country-year of IO formation from 1965 to 2000, the years for which there is annual data on IO membership. We limit our sample to the country-year of IO formation because our tests seek to identify how democratization influences the probability that country i , when forming an IO at time t , will form an IO with strict accession rules. The remainder of this section will present our dependent variable, key independent variable, estimation approach, and control variables.

¹⁴ Thereby highlighting how, under particular circumstances, even an established democracy can be considered a “bad apple”.

3.1 Dependent variable: Strict accession voting rules

We mentioned above that accession rules are among the most important design features of any international institution.¹⁵ We reviewed the accession criteria of the 324 organizations in the *Corre-lates of War* IO (Pevehouse et al. 2004) dataset for which treaties are available. One might commonly think of accession rules in the context of the European Union, meaning strict rules that candidate states must satisfy before even being considered for membership. However, explicit policy requirements are actually quite rare. We only identified 103 of the IO treaties as mentioning the need for accession candidates to meet explicit conditions for membership.¹⁶ Of these 103 treaties, nearly all simply indicate that the terms of accession shall be agreed upon between the candidate state and the existing members. For example, Article 56 of the agreement for the European Free Trade Association reads, "Any State may accede to this Convention, provided that the Council decides to approve its accession, on such terms and conditions as may be set out in that decision...".¹⁷ The phrase "conditions as may be set out in that decision" indicates that the acceding members and the existing members are to bargain over the entrance criteria. In another example, Article 33 of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs states,

A government not party to this Agreement, or a government acting on behalf of a separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement, may accede to this Agreement, on its own behalf or on behalf of that territory, on terms to be agreed between such government and the Contracting Parties....¹⁸

The phrase "on terms to be agreed" again points to the need for the existing members and the acceding state to clarify the conditions for that particular candidate. Consider also the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an IO commonly perceived as holding candidate members to strict criteria. This IO has, in actuality, no explicit accession criteria. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty simply states, "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty."¹⁹

While the North Atlantic Treaty specifies no explicit conditions, it does highlight the critical role played by voting rules: Article 10 requires the unanimous consent of the existing members. If a sufficient number of the existing members desire that a state joins the IO, then the extent to which the states have met the other criteria does not matter. There is no reason for existing members to impose specific accession criteria when they can simply use voting rules to choose any criteria for any given instance. In

¹⁵ In a related study, Blake and Payton (2015) measure the voting rules within the decision-making process of an institution, but not specifically the accession rules. They find that a vast majority (97 %) have voting rules, which is the exact opposite of accession rules (where a majority have no rule).

¹⁶ While space does not permit a list of all the relevant treaty articles in the main text, Appendix C provides the accession treaty articles for these 103 IOs.

¹⁷ Article 56 of the European Free Trade Association Convention. Available at <http://www.Efta.int>. Accessed on April 5, 2014.

¹⁸ Article 33 of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 1947. Available at <http://www.wto.org>. Accessed on April 5, 2014.

¹⁹ Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Available at <http://www.nato.int>. Accessed on April 5, 2014.

effect, voting rules capture a key element of informal governance: though various conditions can be placed on membership, the only condition that ultimately matters is whether a sufficient number of existing members deem the candidate worthy.

This point is perhaps most vividly illustrated by Turkey's accession to NATO in the 1950s. The British and Americans were completely aware of Turkey's strategic importance and military capabilities (Yeşilbursa 1999, 79). However, the British and Americans initially chose to exclude Turkey from NATO because, in addition to a disagreement about whether Turkey's geographic location made NATO the appropriate security apparatus, the British and Americans questioned Turkey's willingness to project capabilities outside of Turkey (Helicke 2012, 72). To remedy this uncertainty, the Turkish government needed to signal its willingness to use its forces to support the Western powers. As the Turkish Foreign Minister Koprülü stated on June 1, 1950, "our foreign policy, which has been oriented towards the West since the Second World War, will take a more energetic form in this direction" (Helicke 2012, 73). On July 25, 1950 the Turkish government, quite unexpectedly, announced that it would be the second UN member, after the United States, to send troops to Korea (Helicke 2012, 73). Immediately following this, Turkey reapplied for NATO admission and, after first being designated an 'associated member' in September 1950, was granted full membership (along with Greece) in 1952 (Yeşilbursa 1999, 77).

Given the importance of voting rules, we code the voting rules in the above mentioned 324 IOs. Table 1 summarizes our coding of voting criteria. To conduct this coding, we read the text of each treaty governing the decision-making procedures of each IO, found the provisions pertaining to accession, and then coded the treaty as having voting rules if the provision explicitly mentions a voting requirement and/or if it explicitly stated the number of existing members that must consent to the accession of a new member. Admittedly, our coding rule is quite conservative. For example, Article 9 of the Warsaw Pact (which established the Warsaw Treaty Organization) states, "Such accession shall enter into force with the agreement of the Parties to the Treaty after the declaration of accession has been deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic." In contrast to Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, this provision gives no mention to the number of parties that must be in agreement. Though it is likely implied that, like NATO, unanimous consent is required, we chose to code such ambiguous cases as zero.

The result is that few organizations are coded as having explicit voting criteria. Indeed, as Table 1 reports, the vast majority of IOs (229) specify no voting rules. Appendix B provides the actual treaty articles related to accession for these 229 IOs in order to make transparent why we coded them as not containing voting rules. A small number of IOs (11) explicitly state that there are no voting criteria for joining the IO. For example, the Arctic Council identifies the existing members and does not allow for new members. Very few organizations (4) require only a simple majority of existing members. The most common voting rule (if a voting rule is specified) is some form of super-majority criteria: 2/3 majority (20 organizations); 3/4 majority (9 organizations), and unanimous voting (51 organizations). These super majority categories form our measure of strict accession criteria.²⁰ We use these data to code the voting rules of the

²⁰ The fact that unanimous voting is the most common of the super-majority categories opens a number of avenues for informal governance procedures since, as described in the introduction, it can allow one intransigent existing member to stop the accession of an otherwise worthy state.

Table 1 Voting rules summary

| Voting criteria | Number of IOs | Example IO | Example article |
|---------------------------|---------------|--|--|
| No voting rule specified | 229 | International Labor Organization | Article 2: Any original member of the United Nations and any State admitted to membership to the United Nations...may become a Member |
| Explicitly no voting rule | 11 | The Arctic Council | Article 2: Members are: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States of America |
| Simple majority vote | 4 | Hague Conference on Private International Law | Article 2 (2): The admission of new Member States shall be decided upon by the Governments of the participating States, upon the proposal of one or more of them, by a majority of the votes cast.... |
| 2/3 majority vote | 20 | United Nations [†] | Rule 136: If the Security Council recommends the applicant State for membership, the General Assembly shall consider whether the applicant is a peace-loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter and shall decide, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, upon its application for membership |
| 3/4 majority vote | 9 | International Council for the Exploration of the Sea | ARTICLE 16 (4): the Government of any State may apply to accede to this Convention... after the approval of the Governments of three quarters of the states which have already deposited their instruments of ratification. |
| Unanimous vote | 51 | NATO | Article 10: The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite... |
| Total | 324 | | |

[†] Rule applies to the General Assembly Vote. The Security Council must approve with supermajority vote (9 out of 15), with none of the 5 permanent members (US, UK, France, China, and USSR/Russia) voting against

IO when a state forms a new IO. Because we are interested in when states participate in the formation of IOs with strict accession rules, the dependent variables takes on a value of 1 if state i in year t participated in the formation of an IO with strict accession rules, zero if the state i in year t participated in the formation of an IO without strict accession rules.

3.2 Key independent variable: Democratization

Our primary independent variable is *Democratization*. It is a binary variable that equals 1 if the -10 to 10 Polity IV score of state i is 6 or higher at time t but was below 6 at

time $t - 5$.²¹ Otherwise, it scores zero. Overall, at any given time, approximately 5 % of all countries were in the process of a democratic transition, with the proportion being much higher after than before the end of the Cold War. This specification captures all political transitions that make a country a democracy, as indicated by competitive elections and institutional constraints on the executive's authority. In the main analysis, we compare the effect of democratization against the baseline of *all* other states.

At this point, it is useful to consider the basic relationship between democratization and the propensity of a state to form an IO with strict voting rules. To begin, consider Table 2. This table lists the democratizing countries in our data that participated in the formation of a new IO with strict voting rules.²² Table 2 reveals that the democratizing states are found in a variety of regions (from Asia, to Europe, to South America, to Africa). Table 2 also reveals that the majority of instances took place in the 1990s, with 1995 appearing to be a key year (with the formation of the WTO). In the analysis described below, we conduct a test which attempts to account for the possibility that our results might be driven by this single critical year.

3.3 Control variables

To isolate the influence of democratization, we include several control variables (summary statistics are found in Appendix A). To begin, we include a number of other variables drawn from the study of Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008) on the relationship between democratization and IO formation. *Former Communist* is coded 1 for states that previously had communist governments, beginning in the first year after communist rule. Given that the international institutions established by the Soviet Union had collapsed, one may suspect that states in the Soviet bloc had unusually strong reasons to form new organizations and to prevent membership by Russia into those organizations. Similarly, since recently independent states may have a strong need to become IO members and may have unique concerns that will lead them to control membership in their IOs, the variable *Independence* is the number of years state i has been an independent nation-state as of year t . Mansfield and Pevehouse include a variety of dummy variables capturing a state's geographic region. We include regional dummies so as to account for regional heterogeneity not captured by our other variables.

Next, we include variables that account for trends in the data. The variable *Year* simply indicates the year of the observation. This allows us to account for possible temporal trends. Also, the variable *Number of IOs Globally* accounts for the trend of increasing international institutionalization over time (Shanks et al. 1996). This variable helps guard against conflating the effect of democratization with a general tendency

²¹ There is no standard in international relations for when a state should be considered a democracy on the Polity scale. For example, some studies use a rather conservative measure of polity ≥ 7 (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008), while others adopt a more generous coding of polity ≥ 5 (Lai and Reiter 2000; Gibler 2008). We follow Jagers and Gurr (1995); Marshall et al. (2010) by using the middle of these two options.

²² In many respects, Table 2, due to strict adherence to our coding rules, provides a conservative depiction of the relationship between democratization and the formation of IOs with strict accession voting rules. For example, MERCOSUR's creation in 1991 is not included on this list because, according our coding rules for democratization, Paraguay was one year away from democratization (1992), and Brazil and Uruguay had been democratizing for 6 years (1985).

Table 2 Democratizing states that participated in forming of IO with strict accession rules

| Country | Year | IO Abbreviation | IO Name |
|----------------|------|-----------------|---|
| Bangladesh | 1995 | WTO | World Trade Organization |
| Benin | 1993 | AFRISTAT | Observatoire economique et statistique d'Afrique subsharienne |
| Bulgaria | 1990 | EBRD | European Bank for Reconstruction & Development |
| Chile | 1991 | COSAVE | Ficha Informativa del Comité de Sanidad Vegetal |
| Czechoslovakia | 1992 | CEFTA | Central Europe FTA |
| Greece | 1975 | EUROFOUND | European Foundation for Improvement of Living & Work Conditions |
| Guyana | 1994 | CFATF | Caribbean Financial Action Task Force |
| Guyana | 1995 | WTO | World Trade Organization |
| Hungary | 1990 | EBRD | European Bank for Reconstruction & Development |
| Hungary | 1992 | CEFTA | Central Europe FTA |
| Lesotho | 1995 | WTO | World Trade Organization |
| Madagascar | 1995 | WTO | World Trade Organization |
| Malawi | 1995 | WTO | World Trade Organization |
| Mali | 1993 | AFRISTAT | Observatoire economique et statistique d'Afrique subsharienne |
| Mali | 1995 | WTO | World Trade Organization |
| Mozambique | 1995 | WTO | World Trade Organization |
| Niger | 1993 | AFRISTAT | Observatoire economique et statistique d'Afrique subsharienne |
| Pakistan | 1974 | ISDB | Islamic Development Bank |
| Paraguay | 1995 | WTO | World Trade Organization |
| Philippines | 1989 | APEC | Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation |
| Poland | 1992 | CEFTA | Central Europe FTA |
| Poland | 1995 | WTO | World Trade Organization |
| South Africa | 1995 | WTO | World Trade Organization |
| South Korea | 1989 | APEC | Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation |
| South Korea | 1990 | EBRD | European Bank for Reconstruction & Development |
| Sudan | 1986 | IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Drought Protection |
| Thailand | 1995 | WTO | World Trade Organization |
| Turkey | 1965 | OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| Turkey | 1985 | ECO | Economic Cooperation Organization |
| Zambia | 1992 | SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| Zambia | 1995 | WTO | World Trade Organization |

towards increased international institutionalization. For a similar reason, we include a variable that measures the number of total IOs in which state i is a member in year t .

Finally, we use World Bank data to include the country's GDP per capita (in constant 1995 US \$), as country wealth is correlated with democratization (Przeworski et al. 2000). Population is also included to account for the possible link between country size and democratization (Dahl and Tufté 1973; Gerring and Zarecki 2011).

4 Results

We present two sets of empirical results. First, we evaluate the relationship between democratization and the choice of accession rules. Second, we present results from tests that evaluate our causal mechanisms underlying our main hypothesis.

4.1 Testing the main hypotheses

Table 3 reports the results from our models with control variables. Because we have a binary dependent variable, we estimate the relationship between *Democratization* and the formation of an IO with strict voting rules by using a logit model. Consistent with our theoretical expectations and in line with our first hypothesis, we find that the coefficient on democratization is large and statistically significant. However, since a logit is a nonlinear estimator, this coefficient does not report a substantive effect. We compute the substantive effect in three steps. First, we compute the predicted probability of forming an IO with strict voting rules when *Democratization* = 0, with all other variables set to their mean if continuous or to their proportion if dichotomous. Second, we compute the predicted probability of forming an IO with strict voting rules when *Democratization* = 1, similarly holding all other variables to their mean or proportion. Third, we compute the percentage change between these two values. Following these steps, we find that democratization increases the probability of forming an IO with strict accession rules by 50 percent (from a predicted probability of 0.22 to a predicted probability of 0.33).

To gain further confidence in our main finding, Table 3 presents results from two additional models. As mentioned above, inspecting our data showed that there was a spike in the formation of IOs in 1995. Therefore, we re-ran our main analysis with observations from the year 1995 removed. Our results remain robust. Second, we examine the effect of democratization on forming IOs while controlling for states being established democracies or established autocracies. The inclusion of these controls amounts to changing the baseline of comparison to autocratizing states. Again, the results are robust to this change in model specification. Overall, the results in Table 3 lend strong support to our hypothesized relationship between democratization and the formation of IOs with strict accession voting rules.

4.2 Testing the mechanism

To this point, we have shown that democratization is associated with the formation of IOs with strict voting rules. While consistent with our theoretical expectations, we wish to empirically identify the mechanism explaining this association. The causal mechanism is the need to keep undesirable members out of the organization. For democratizing states, an obvious undesirable member is an autocratic state. Compared to other democratizing states and established democracies, autocracies have no normative interest in supporting processes of democratization. Hence, we seek to identify if strict rules are used to keep autocracies out of the new IOs. This entails examining if strict accession rules actually work. If their goal is to keep undesirable members outside, then strict accession rules should reduce the participation of states whose membership is not helpful for democratic transition. At the very least, organizations with many

Table 3 Relationship between democratization and forming a new IO with strict voting rules

| | Main model | Removal of year 1995 | Control for established democracy and autocracy |
|--|---------------------|----------------------|---|
| Democratization | 0.56** (0.25) | 0.67** (0.32) | 0.82** (0.34) |
| <i>Control variables</i> | | | |
| N. America | -0.48 (0.30) | -0.46 (0.34) | -0.55* (0.31) |
| S. America | -1.08*** (0.28) | -1.58*** (0.36) | -1.14*** (0.29) |
| Europe | -0.71** (0.29) | -0.65** (0.32) | -0.77*** (0.29) |
| Middle East | 0.12 (0.24) | 0.18 (0.26) | 0.23 (0.25) |
| Former Communist Country | -0.17 (0.43) | -0.11 (0.55) | 0.05 (0.44) |
| Newly Independent Country | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Year | 0.39*** (0.08) | 0.45*** (0.09) | 0.39*** (0.08) |
| Number of IO Memberships | 0.01* (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) |
| Global Number of IOs | -0.05*** (0.01) | -0.06*** (0.01) | -0.05*** (0.01) |
| WBDI:GDP per capita (constant 1995 US\$) | 0.26*** (0.06) | 0.26*** (0.07) | 0.19*** (0.07) |
| WBDI:Population, total | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Established Democracy | | | 0.56* (0.31) |
| Established Autocracy | | | 0.13 |
| Constant | -777.40*** (161.80) | -885.31*** (179.18) | (0.27) -772.71*** (162.19) |
| Number of observations | 1356 | 1259 | 1356 |

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

democratizing members should admit fewer autocratic states when they have strict accession rules, as compared to the case of lax accession rules. Based on the above discussion, this should be especially valid if the original membership includes democratizing countries.

Specifically, we consider the number of autocracies that actually join an IO *after* its creation. We compute, for each IO, the change in the number of autocracies in the IO from the year after the IO's creation to five years after the IO's creation.²³ Having computed this figure for the IOs for which we having voting criteria data, the mean number of autocracies that joined an IO since creation is 2.68 (over 304 IOs), with a minimum value of -6, and a maximum value of 49.²⁴ Next, we divide the data into those IOs with strict voting rules and those IOs with non-strict voting rules.

We find that, consistent with expectations, IOs with strict voting rules had, on average, fewer autocracies join after 5 years (an average of 0.51 autocracies over 55 IOs) compared to IOs with non-strict voting rules (an average of 3.16 autocracies over 249 IOs).

²³ For this analysis, we have a sample of 304 IOs because several IOs existed for less than 5 years.

²⁴ The - 6 value results from autocratic states leaving the IO over the first 5 years of the IO's existence.

Testing our mechanism requires conditioning on the involvement of democratizing states in the creation of the IO. Therefore, we conduct simple regression analysis where the number of autocracies that joined an IO during the five years following the IO's creation is regressed (using Ordinary Least Squares) on whether or not the IO had strict voting rules. We conduct this regression over two groups: those IOs where no democratizing states were involved in the IOs' creation and those IOs where at least one democratizing state was involved in the IOs' creation. The results from this analysis are reported in column (1) of Table 4. In these regressions, the coefficient on the strict voting criteria independent variable captures the number of additional/fewer democracies that are in the IO due to the strict voting criteria. The results from these simple regressions tell us that having strict voting rules results in 1.25 fewer autocracies when no democratizing states are involved in IO creation and 5.7 fewer autocracies when at least one democratizing state is involved in IO creation. This is consistent with our proposed mechanism.

Column (2) reports the results when we control for a number IO features, such as whether the IO has a high or moderate level of institutionalization, whether the IO has a political or technical function, the proportion of IO members located in Africa, Latin America, or Europe (regions with a notable number of democratizations), and the year of the observation.²⁵ While doing so slightly reduces the size of the coefficient on the strict voting criteria variable, the results are again consistent with our proposed mechanism.

Since the number of autocracies to join an IO after 5 years is a count variable, not a continuous variable, column (3) takes the same variables as the model in column (2) and applies them to a negative binomial count model. Because this model can only consider non-negative values, we remove observations where the change in the number of autocracies was negative.²⁶ While the size of the coefficient on strict voting criteria is substantially decreased in both groups, the size of the coefficient is over six times as large when at least one democratizing state was involved in the IOs' creation compared to having no democratizing states involved in the IO's creation. These results are again consistent with our expectation that democratizing states include strict voting criteria in IOs for the purpose of reducing the number of autocracies.

5 Conclusion

Democratizing states form IOs to help manage their regime transition and promote democratic consolidation. As they form IOs, they face the challenge of institutional design. We have investigated this problem through the lens of accession rules. We have argued that as democratizing states design their IOs, their incentive is to use strict accession rules to regulate entry. This allows them to prevent undesirable members, such as autocracies hostile to their democratic transition. Of the different potentially

²⁵ Institutionalization data are from Boehmer et al. (2004) and Ingram et al. (2005), while IO function data are based on the authors' own modifications to the membership data from Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008, 290).

²⁶ This removes 18 observations from the group of IOs where at least one democratizing state was involved in the IOs' creation and 26 observations from the group of IOs where no democratizing states were involved in the IOs' creation.

Table 4 Regressions of number of autocracies joining IO 5 years after creation

| Estimation approach: | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|--|----------------|------------------|-------------------|
| | OLS | OLS | Negative Binomial |
| <i>Sample: IOs with at least One Democratizing State at Creation</i> | | | |
| Strict Voting Criteria | -5.72** (2.49) | -5.10** (2.61) | -2.05*** (0.55) |
| Control Variables | | | |
| Political IO | | -0.27 (2.68) | -0.85* (0.44) |
| Technical IO | | 3.92 (2.71) | 0.17 (0.36) |
| Highly Institutionalized IO | | 2.79 (2.91) | 1.09** (0.47) |
| Moderately Institutionalized IO | | 4.24* (2.28) | 1.01** (0.34) |
| Proportion of IO members in Africa | | -58.99 (43.48) | -9.75 (6.78) |
| Proportion of IO members in Latin America | | -87.66* (50.31) | -36.26*** (13.40) |
| Proportion of IO members in Europe | | -70.33* (37.72) | -36.65*** (8.26) |
| Year of Observation | | -0.08 (0.05) | -0.04*** (0.01) |
| Constant | 5.82*** (1.13) | 153.77 (106.79) | 81.33*** (24.48) |
| α | | | 0.91*** (0.20) |
| Number of observations | 96 | 96 | 78 |
| <i>Sample: IOs with No Democratizing States at Creation</i> | | | |
| Strict Voting Criteria | -1.25 (0.98) | -0.93 (0.99) | -0.32 (0.44) |
| Control Variables | | | |
| Political IO | | 1.41 (1.19) | 0.27 (0.42) |
| Technical IO | | -0.40 (0.91) | -0.59 (0.42) |
| Highly Institutionalized IO | | 1.01 (1.40) | -0.11 (0.54) |
| Moderately Institutionalized IO | | 1.47* (0.80) | 0.43 (0.32) |
| Proportion of IO members in Africa | | -3.97 (11.18) | -5.51 (5.34) |
| Proportion of IO members in Latin America | | -15.23* (8.26) | -23.84*** (6.13) |
| Proportion of IO members in Europe | | -21.06** (10.07) | -29.87*** (6.17) |
| Year of Observation | | -0.00 (0.02) | -0.02** (0.01) |
| Constant | 2.04*** (0.41) | 7.40 (36.77) | 41.48** (18.43) |
| α | | | 2.56*** (0.43) |
| Number of observations | 208 | 208 | 182 |

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

relevant accession rules, voting rules are substantively the most important, and so our analysis focused on their design.

The findings address some significant puzzles in the study of international organizations. Most importantly, they shed light on the problems that democratizing states face as they apply international strategies to govern their own transitions. Previous work found that democratizing states form their own IOs (Poast and Urpelainen 2013). But what do democratizing states expect to achieve with this strategy? By looking at accession rules, we show that democratizing states are concerned with the possibility of undesirable states entering the IO.

More generally, the study testifies to the importance of institutional design in international organizations. As democratizing states seek international strategies to manage their democratic transitions, they must somehow overcome problems of cooperation. According to our results, restrictions on entry are an important instrument that democratizing states apply to deal with cooperation problems. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that other states could not use accession rules to restrict entry into their exclusive clubs. We have focused on democratization due to its intrinsic importance as a phenomenon in the late 20th century, but many other states may have compelling reasons to prevent undesirable countries from joining their IOs. Countries may block new members for economic, security, political, and cultural reasons. Our theory, data, and empirical approach can be applied to such cases, and we hope that this study facilitates such an effort.

References

- Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (1998). Why states act through formal international organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(1), 3–32.
- Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (2010). International regulation without international government: improving IO performance through orchestration. *Review of International Organizations*, 5(3), 315–344.
- Blake, Daniel, and Autumn Lockwood Payton. (2015). Balancing design objectives: analyzing new data on voting rules in intergovernmental organizations. *The Review of International Organizations* 10(3):337–402.
- Boehmer, C., Gartzke, E., & Nordstrom, T. (2004). Do intergovernmental organizations promote peace? *World Politics*, 57(1), 1–38.
- Camps, Miriam. 1959. Britain and the European Market, The Free Trade Area Negotiations. *Political and Economic Planning Occasional Paper No. 2*.
- Camps, Miriam. 1960. Britain and the European Market, Division in Europe. *Political and Economic Planning Occasional Paper No. 8*.
- Dahl, R., & Tufte, E. (1973). *Size and democracy*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Davis, Christina. 2013. *Membership conditionality and institutional reform: the case of the OECD*. Unpublished Working Paper.
- Davis, Christina, and Meredith Wilf. 2012. *Joining the club: accession to the GATT/WTO*. Unpublished Working Paper.
- Conseil de la République, ed. 1952. *Débats Parlementaires, Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier—Suite de la discussion et adoption d'un avis sur un projet de loi, Session de 1952—Compte Rendu in Extenso*. Vol. 28e Séance Conseil de la République.
- de Mesquita, B., Bruce, A. S., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). *The logic of political survival*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Downs, G. W., Roche, D. M., & Barsoom, P. N. (1998). Managing the evolution of multilateralism. *International Organization*, 52(2), 397–419.
- Gardini, G. L. (2010). *The Origins of Mercosur: Democracy and Regionalization in South America*. New York: Palgrave.
- Gerring, John, and Dominic Zarecki. 2011. *Size and democracy revisited*. DISC Working Papers.
- Gibler, D. M. (2008). The costs of renegeing: reputation and alliance formation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52(3), 426–455.
- Gilligan, M. J. (2004). Is there a broader-deeper trade-off in international multilateral agreements? *International Organization*, 58(3), 459–484.
- Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. R. (1995). *The political economy of democratic transitions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. R. (1997). The political economy of democratic transitions. *Comparative Politics*, 29(3), 263–283.

- Helicke, James C. 2012. Turkey's Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1945–1952: A Qualified Success? In Melissa P. Yeager, and Charles carter (Ed). *Pacts and Alliances in History: Diplomatic Strategy and The Politics of Coalitions*, I.B. Tauris.
- Ingram, P., Robinson, J., & Busch, M. L. (2005). The intergovernmental network of world trade: IGO connectedness, governance, and embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology*, 111(3), 824–858.
- Ito, P. (2013). Baltic Military Cooperation Projects: A Record of Success. In T. Lawrence, & T. Jermalvicus (Eds.), *Apprenticeship, Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of Defence Development in the Baltic States* (pp. 240–275). Tallinn: International Centre for Defence Studies.
- Jaggers, K., & Gurr, T. R. (1995). Tracking democracy's third wave with the polity III data. *Journal of Peace Research*, 32(4), 469–482.
- Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2001). The rational design of international institutions. *International Organization*, 55(4), 761–799.
- Kydd, A. (2001). Trust building, trust breaking: the dilemma of NATO enlargement. *International Organization*, 55(4), 801–828.
- Lai, B., & Reiter, D. (2000). Democracy, political similarity, and international alliances, 1816–1992. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44(2), 203–227.
- Mansfield, E. D., & Pevehouse, J. C. (2006). Democratization and international organizations. *International Organization*, 60(1), 137–167.
- Mansfield, E. D., & Pevehouse, J. C. (2008). Democratization and the varieties of international organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52(2), 269–294.
- Marshall, Monty, Keith Jaggers, and Ted Robert Gurr. 2010. *Polity IV Project: Dataset Users's Manual*.
- Mattli, W., & Plümpert, T. (2004). The internal value of external options: how the EU shapes the scope of regulatory reforms in transition countries. *European Union Politics*, 5(3), 307–330.
- Meyer, F. V. (1960). *The European Free Trade Association, An Analysis of The Outer Seven*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers.
- Moravcsik, A. (2000). The origins of human rights regimes: democratic delegation in postwar Europe. *International Organization*, 54(2), 217–252.
- March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1998). The institutional dynamics of international political orders. *International Organization*, 52(4), 943–969.
- Pevehouse, J. C. (2005). *Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pevehouse, J., Nordstrom, T., & Wamke, K. (2004). The correlates of war 2 international governmental organizations data version 2.0. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 21(2), 101–119.
- Poast, P., & Urpelainen, J. (2013). Fit and feasible: why democratizing states form, not join, international organizations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 57(4), 831–841.
- Prunier, G. (2008). *Africa's World War Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000). *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950–1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Reuter, P. (1953). *La Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier*. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droits et de Jurisprudence.
- Rudka, A., & Mizsei, K. (1994). The fall of trade in east-Central Europe: is CEFTA the right solution? *Russian and East European Finance and Trade*, 30(1), 6–31.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2005). Strategic calculation and international socialization: membership incentives, party constellations, and sustained compliance in central and eastern Europe. *International Organization*, 59(4), 827–860.
- Schneider, C. J., & Urpelainen, J. (2012). Accession rules for international institutions: a legitimacy-efficacy trade-off? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 56(2), 290–312.
- Scuppa, G. (1955-1956). La clause d'adhésion et ses modalités d'application dans le traité instituant la communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier. *Saar-Europa: Hefte des Europa*, 2, 70–80.
- Shaffer, G. (2005). Can WTO technical assistance and capacity-building serve developing countries? *Wisconsin International Law Journal*, 23(4), 643–686.
- Shanks, C., Jacobson, H. K., & Kaplan, J. H. (1996). Inertia and change in the constellation of international governmental organizations, 1981–1992. *International Organization*, 50(4), 593–627.
- Steinberg, R. H. (2002). In the shadow of law or power? Consensus-based bargaining and outcomes in the GATT/WTO. *International Organization*, 56(2), 339–374.
- Stone, R. W. (2011). *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- The Globe and Mail. 1992. Southern Africa Signs Treaty. August 20.

- VanDeveer, S. D., & Dabelko, G. D. (2001). It's capacity, stupid: international Assistance and national implementation. *Global Environmental Politics*, 1(2), 18–29.
- Vignes, D. (1956). *La Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier*. Paris: Librarie Générale de Droits et de Jurisprudence.
- Whitehead, L. (Ed.) (1996). *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wintrobe, R. (1998). *The political economy of dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Yeşilbursa, B. K. (1999). Turkey's participation in the middle east command and its admission to NATO, 1950–52. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 35(4), 70–102.