Fit and Feasible: Why Democratizing States Form, not Join, International Organizations[1]

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Does democratization make states join existing international organizations (IOs)? Previous research suggests that democratization increases a state's propensity to join IOs capable of assisting in the distribution of public goods and establishing credibility for domestic reforms. We argue that this is not the case. Instead, recent democratization has a strong effect on a state's propensity to form new IOs. Since democratizing states face different governance problems than established democracies, existing IOs may not be a good ''fit.'' Additionally, established democracies might hesitate to allow democratizing states membership in the most lucrative existing IOs, thereby making immediate accession to such IOs not ''feasible.'' Quantitative analysis shows that democratization has a strong and consistently positive effect on the probability of forming a new IO, but not on the probability of joining an existing IO. The findings suggest that international cooperation theorists should begin to analyze forming new and joining existing IOs as alternative strategies that states can use to achieve their policy goals.

Ending decades of autocratic rule is painful. Transitioning democracies often lack the capacity to provide public goods and to credibly commit to domestic policy reforms. Since international organizations (IOs) can assist in these areas, scholars claim that democratization increases the probability that a state joins IOs (Whitehead 1996; Moravcsik 2000; Pevehouse 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006). However, as anyone who has sought membership in an exclusive club knows, the doors are typically shut to the less credentialed. The current members of an IO may focus on their own cooperation problems or demand excessive concessions from unstable and fragile democratizers. The barriers to joining existing IOs are reflected in a May 2002 statement by Toomas Ilves, Estonia's Foreign Minister at the time: ''In dealing with laws that are the norm of the organization you want to join, your choice is to abide by them or decide not to join. If you don't want to join, fine, do it your way. But you can't say, 'We'll take the EU subsidies, but we won't meet them on standards'.''[2]

This begs a question: does democratization actually make states *join* existing IOs or does democratization lead states to instead *form* their own IOs? Moreover, what determines the choice between these alternative strategies? The existing literature simply highlights the benefits accorded by IO membership and assumes that democratizing states join established IOs for these benefits.

The question of forming or joining cannot be ignored for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoretically, governments face tradeoffs when choosing to join existing IOs or establish new IOs. Establishing a new IO requires a design effort, but by designing the IO, the democratizing states improve the fit between the institutional solution and the problems at hand. Joining an existing IO does not require a design effort, but might prove infeasible since democratizing countries must accept membership conditions dictated by current IO members. How do governments of democratizing states deal with these tradeoffs?

Empirically, joining and forming IOs also produce divergent observable implications. If democratizing states join existing IOs, then waves of democratization should expand the geographic coverage of a limited number of existing IOs. However, if democratizing states form new IOs, then we would expect a profusion of new IOs to follow waves of democratization.

We argue that recent democratization increases a state's propensity to establish new IOs but not the propensity of joining existing ones. When democratizing states consider institutional solutions to their problems, they seek to maximize the ''fit'' between the institutional solution sought and the problem they face (Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal 2013). For a democratizing state, existing IOs are often a poor fit. Democratizing states must create domestic institutional capacity for providing public goods and implementing policy reforms. However, since many existing IOs were created by established democracies that face an altogether different set of problems, existing IOs are often not the best solution to the democratizing state's needs. Additionally, democratizing states must consider the ''feasibility'' of different institutional solutions. While some existing IOs promise lucrative benefits, joining these existing IOs is often not feasible for democratizing states. For one thing, established democracies may hesitate to allow democratizing states to join the most lucrative existing IOs. Moreover, in some regions of the world, few suitable IOs exist.

This argument departs from Mansfield and Pevehouse's (2006) claim that democratizing states *join* existing

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[2] *Baltic Times* on May 16, 2002. Quoted in Kelley (2004:442).

IOs to credibly commit to political-economic reform. Credible commitment is important, but existing IOs often do not enable credible commitments because they were designed to address problems not relevant to democratizing states. Moreover, while Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) assume that democratizing states can easily join existing IOs, the obstacles to IO membership are formidable. Thus, democratizing states must rely on forming new IOs.

We test this argument using data on IO membership and formation (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004). Our empirical analysis improves on previous research by distinguishing between joining existing and forming new IOs. We show that democratization has a strong and consistent effect on the probability of forming a new IO, but not on the probability of joining an existing IO. We also find that the difference is driven by the formation of highly institutionalized IOs capable of enforcing commitments. This suggests that while democratizing states are unable to use existing IOs to pursue their interests, the need for credible commitment may nonetheless explain why democratic transitions increase the demand for IO formation.

Our argument and findings offer three broad contributions to the study of international institutions. First, scholars have previously examined IO formation and the decision to join an IO as separate questions (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Mattli 1999; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001).[3] But treating these as alternate strategies for solving cooperation problems allows us to simultaneously explain why new IOs are formed and why existing IOs attract new members. Second, we offer new insights into the profusion of IOs. Our theory implies that IO profusion may reflect the rich variety of cooperation problems that different states face at different times. If extant IOs are not equipped to address new cooperation problems in rapidly changing circumstances, states will incur the costs of creating new IOs. Finally, understanding the effect of IOs on cooperation outcomes requires investigating the origins of IOs. If states create IOs to address specific problems, this will be reflected in the design of these IOs. But organizations are often "sticky" (March and Olsen 1998), so these original needs may continue to exert influence on future cooperation outcomes. Thus, the initial context of IO formation can influence its effects in the future, even as the international system and domestic circumstances change.

The article is organized as follows. First, we summarize the conventional view on the relationship between democratization and IOs, showing that previous scholarship has not addressed the choice between joining and forming IOs. Second, we argue that recent democratization increases a state's willingness to form new IOs but not join existing ones. Third, we describe the research design and results. Fourth, we examine the institutionalization of IOs formed by democratizing states. The concluding section focuses on the broader implications of the analysis.[4]

Democratization and IOs: The Conventional View

What do democratizing states gain from IO membership? In general, states design international institutions to solve cooperation problems that cannot be overcome by decentralized solutions (Keohane 1984; Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996; Koremenos et al. 2001). As Abbott and Snidal (1998:28) state, "[by] taking advantage of the centralization and independence of IOs, states are able to achieve goals that they cannot accomplish on a decentralized basis…IOs provide an important supplement to decentralized cooperation that affects the nature and performance of the international system."

The conventional wisdom emphasizes that democratization promotes IO membership (Moravcsik 2000; Pevehouse 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006). When a state undergoes a democratic transition, the government must design institutions and enact public policies that allow effective democratic governance. IOs help the government of a democratizing country improve domestic policy formation, which facilitates political survival in competitive elections. This is for two reasons.

First, democratization increases the demand for public goods, broadly defined as policies that benefit broad constituencies in the society. Democratizing states might need IO assistance because they lack the domestic institutions capable of providing public goods (VanDeveer and Dabelko 2001; Mattli and Plümper 2004; Schimmelfennig 2005; Shaffer 2005; Abbott and Snidal 2010). Policies included under the heading of "public goods" include environmental protection (VanDeveer and Dabelko 2001), combating corruption (Banerjee 1997), building public infrastructure that increases investment (Henisz 2002), and even assistance in organizing free and fair elections (Donno 2010). Since autocratic developing countries have little need for capacity building to improve the provision of public goods (Wintrobe 1998; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003), democratization leaves the new regime with a difficult challenge: It must face high expectations for public good provision, but without an administrative apparatus that has experience in doing so (Haggard and Kaufman 1997).[5] A history of autocratic rule implies that the governance apparatus had few incentives to develop effective techniques for public goods provision (Wintrobe 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Therefore, newly democratic governments can benefit from IO expertise on providing public goods. Even if an IO cannot coerce states to comply with rules, it can facilitate information exchange or help states pool resources for policy development (Abbott and Snidal 1998).

Second, credible commitment to policy reform is difficult to achieve, particularly for democratizing states (Kydland and Prescott 1977; Przeworski 1991). Without credible commitment, the country may fall back to autocracy or fail to consolidate the democratic reform (Dewatripont and Roland 1995; Rodrik 1996; Keefer 2007; Svolik 2008). Formal IO membership facilitates reform by allowing a leader to (i) tie her hands and (ii) reveal information to actors outside the regime (Moravcsik 2000; Pevehouse 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Donno 2010). For example, human rights organizations may increase the cost of repression in fragile democracies, thereby reducing the probability of an authoritarian reversal. In other words, formal IO membership allows democratizing states to credibly commit to reform and signal this credibility to domestic and international audiences.

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[3] For an important exception, see Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal (2013).
[4] A supplementary appendix provides additional data description and analyses.

[5] This is not to say that autocratic administrations are ineffective across the board. For example, they may be very effective in quelling domestic opposition.

Many scholars argue that the increased demand for public goods and the problem of credible commitment induce democratizing states to join *existing* IOs (Pevehouse 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008).[6] Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006:141) emphasize that joining existing IOs provides reputational signals; ''Membership in IOs can help the leader of a democratizing country credibly commit to reform… This mechanism stems from information provided by the organization about members' actions, conditions imposed by the organization for new members, and the reputational impact of violating an IO's rules.'' In other words, the extant members of an IO can impose conditions on new members, which increases the cost of reform reversal. The hypothesized effect is particularly strong if the extant members are powerful, established democracies with a direct interest in democratization and marketization. Indeed, the qualitative examples provided in the literature generally illustrate joining an existing organization, such as the EU or the WTO, as opposed to establishing a new one (Whitehead 1996; Pevehouse 2005).

Gray (2007) offers another argument for joining existing IOs—the need to give investors a signal of stability. She argues that economic institutions among unstable countries whose future is subject to great uncertainty—a description that fits remarkably well to democratic transitions—may increase investor risk in these countries. This is so for at least two reasons. First, economic crises may be contagious among the members of the same institution. Second, the members of the institution may regard it as a shield against sanctions by outsiders, so that the members may become less cautious in their economic policy.

In short, previous research fails to distinguish between forming a new IO and joining an existing IO. Indeed, while democratizing states may eventually join an existing IO, we argue in the next section that recent democratization increases a state's propensity to establish new IOs, not the propensity of joining existing ones.

Fit and Feasibility: Democratization and the Formation of New IOs

We argue that democratization increases the number of new IOs that a state forms in a given year. Democratizing states face problems not relevant to the majority of established democracies and autocracies. Consequently, existing IOs may not be designed to solve the specific problems of democratizing states. Additionally, established democracies may initially prevent democratizing states from joining the most lucrative existing IOs, such as the EU or the WTO. Stated differently, we build on the idea of ''institutional fit'' from Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal (2013) to argue that democratizing states create new IOs due to *fit* and *feasibility*. The fit is commonly imperfect between existing IOs and democratizing states' needs, and even if the existing IO is a good fit, joining the most lucrative existing IOs might not be feasible for democratizing states.

Before elaborating, we make three clarifications. First, we focus on the early years of democratization. In the long run, democratic consolidation may transform the domestic political setting, thereby inducing previously

democratizing states to seek membership in existing IOs. For example, many Eastern European countries that democratized in the early 1990s finally acceded to the EU in 2004. In this case, one of the key benefits of forming new IOs in the early years of democratization was gradual policy reform that ultimately enabled the countries to accede to the EU.

Second, we do not focus on a narrow set of political institutional reforms. Instead, following the extant literature, we argue that democratizing states face a broad variety of new policy problems (Moravcsik 2000; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006). These may range from cumbersome trade regulations to poor environmental policies. Thus, it is inappropriate to restrict the analysis to IOs that focus only on supporting the reform of political institutions.

Finally, we focus on democratization's effect on a state's propensity to join and form IOs, *ceteris paribus*. We do not claim that democratizing states never join existing IOs. States in different regions and times may join extant IOs more often than they form new ones, with or without democratization. These differing base rates are not the subject of our inquiry. We analyze the effect of democratization on joining and forming, relative to the base rate without democratization.

Fit

The conventional wisdom holds that joining existing IOs is the most expedient strategy for democratizing states. First, IO creation is costly and difficult (Keohane 1984; Abbott and Snidal 1998; Koremenos et al. 2001; Jupille and Snidal 2006). Since democratizing states must address a number of urgent domestic issues, they are particularly hesitant to invest in IO creation. Second, joining IOs in which powerful established democracies are existing members can establish for democratizing states a credible commitment to reform (Whitehead 1996; Mattli 1999; Mattli and Plümper 2004; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008). By doing so, a democratizing state (i) maximizes the efficacy of credible commitment because powerful established democracies do not condone defections and (ii) sends a costly signal because powerful established democracies impose the most stringent conditions on new members.

However, forming new IOs also has benefits. First and foremost, democratizing states can design new IOs to address their specific problems. Democratizing states face governance problems that are often not relevant to stable democracies and autocracies. Thus, the institutional fit between existing IOs, which have often been formed by established democracies to address their own specific problems and the problems that democratization creates, is often highly imperfect (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Koremenos et al. 2001). In particular, established democracies have had time to develop domestic solutions to problems that still plague newly democratized states.

More specifically, while democratizing states struggle with fundamental problems of basic political and economic governance, established democracies seek to perfect their already functional administrative structures. This difference means that many organizations formed by established democracies are not geared toward promoting good governance during democratic transitions. To illustrate the argument, consider established democracies' efforts to promote good economic governance and public management through the Organization for Economic

Co-operation and Development. This organization facilitates peer learning, harmonization of regulatory standards, best practices in environmental policy, and statistical management. However, the organization is explicitly designed to pursue the interests of stable democracies with liberal economic systems and capable bureaucracies. Such an organization is hardly of interest to democratizing states struggling with rampant corruption, flawed elections, and lack of meritocratic bureaucratic structures.[7]

Autocratic regimes have fewer incentives to provide broad constituencies with public goods because their rule depends on satisfying the demands of a small national elite with private goods (Wintrobe 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Democratizing states, however, must provide public goods to broad domestic constituencies against a backdrop of ineffective domestic institutions and little experience with democratic governance (Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Keefer 2007). If existing IOs largely focus on solving the international cooperation problems that are only of relevance to stable and well-established regimes, then democratizing states need new IOs that focus on their domestic policy reform needs.

Second, democratizing states may form new IOs because democratization occurs within a specific historical context. The importance of historical context, again, weakens the fit between existing IOs and democratizing states' needs. The distinct historical experiences of different democratizing states influence the preferences of domestic constituencies. For example, as African states became independent, their expectations were shaped by colonial histories, while Eastern European countries were liberated from communist rule. These diverging experiences shaped the expectations of domestic constituencies, and existing IOs were not necessarily designed to solve the problems unique to the citizens of each region's democratizing states.

Forming a new IO with limited input from established democracies has a major limitation: The new IO may ineffectively promote reform in a democratizing state. This is because the other IO members are themselves in no position to enforce stringent conditionalities.[8] But even limited reform may be better than nothing. Although limited reform brings fewer benefits than full reform, it may nonetheless benefit influential domestic constituencies and thus be a good strategy for democratizing states. The importance of institutional fit for forming new IOs is illustrated by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). When established in 1992 to replace the more narrowly focused Development Coordination Conference, seven of the original 13 members were undergoing a democratic transition. Most importantly, the regional hegemon—South Africa—had lifted the ban on domestic political organizations such as the African National Congress and was in the process of allowing the black majority to vote in national elections. Only two members, Botswana and Mauritius, had been governed by democratic governments for more than 5 years. Only three members—Angola, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe—were clearly authoritarian, and Tanzania was undergoing a slow but limited democratic transition.

The importance of democratization for the SADC can be seen in Article 4 of the treaty, as it commits the members to principles of ''human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.'' But SADC also addresses a wide range of issues faced by these democratizing states, including trade, natural resources, and agriculture (Article 21), collective security (Article 5), and measures against corruption (various protocols). While these issues might have been of interest to established democracies, Botswana and Mauritius were the only established democracies in the region, and they had no established IOs to address these issues. For example, the Organization of African Unity (now African Union) focused on general political cooperation, such as defending the sovereignty of African states, instead of addressing concrete governance issues on the ground. Additionally, for autocratic regimes, improving agricultural productivity or achieving trade liberalization to reduce consumer prices (both of which would mostly benefit mass constituencies) was not as important as it would be for transitional democracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Thus, SADC was formed largely because existing IOs were not a good fit for addressing the needs of the region's democratizing countries.[9]

Feasibility

While the fit argument implies that democratizing states may prefer to form new IOs in the early years of democratization, the feasibility argument provides another reason for new IO formation, as democratizing states form new IOs because they are unable to join lucrative existing IOs. That is, for democratizing states, joining existing IOs is often not a feasible strategy. This is for three reasons, each of which boil down to the idea that established democracies often expect few benefits from allowing transitional democracies to join existing IOs.

First, as mentioned above, democratizing states face a unique set of challenges that are often not relevant for established democracies (Dewatripont and Roland 1995; Hellman 1998; Keefer 2007). Although established democracies might have a collective incentive to secure successful reform within democratizing states, they also must attend to their own domestic and international problems. If established democracies are not sufficiently invested in reforms in a transitional democracy, the easiest and most convenient strategy for the established democracies to simply prevent the transitional democracy from joining an existing IO.

Second, democratizing states may fail to join an existing IO because established democracies actively oppose their membership, worrying about reduced cooperation within the IO. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) recognize that the effect of democratization on IO membership may be dampened by the unwillingness of some IOs to allow democratizing states to join. Because democratizing states might hold very different preferences from the established members, allowing them to vote on important issues in existing IOs might create consternation between members. As stated above, this is particularly so for the existing IOs that would produce the largest benefits for democratizing states.

Third, democratizing states may find it costly to join an existing IO with many established democracies. If the

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[7] Another pertinent example is scientific research. While democratizing states can hardly afford to emphasize scientific research, established democracies may value such organizations as the European Space Agency given the importance of innovation.
[8] According to Gray (2007), keeping bad company may even be harmful.

[9] Indeed, Ng'ong'ola (2000:486) specifically notes that potential alternatives for cooperation in the region, such as the South African Customs Union, have failed despite attempts to negotiate enhanced cooperation.

membership provisions of an extant IO require ambitious reforms that a democratizing state's government cannot meet, that government may have to choose between (i) little reform and (ii) gradual reform by forming a new IO with limited membership provisions and enforcement capabilities. In such circumstances, perhaps only the most ambitious and successful democratizing states are able to accede to the established IOs that most efficaciously advance economic reform, such as the EU. An empirical implication of such competition for membership among democratizing states is that many will be unable to join the IO that is the most suitable for their reform purposes. For example, joining the Central and Eastern European Privatization Network in 1991 is obviously not as beneficial as joining the EU, but no postcommunist country would have been able to implement the reforms required for EU membership in the short run.

Not all IOs impose restrictions on membership, but those that do are often valuable ones such as the EU or NATO (Mattli and Plümper 2004). For example, it is common for existing economic IOs to restrict entry by unstable states. Given this, democratizing states can join those IOs that impose no restrictions and/or form their own IOs. Even if they do both, the effect of democratization on forming will be larger than on joining because even nondemocratizing states may join IOs that impose no cost on membership.[10]

For these three reasons, a democratizing state in need of an IO may not find a suitable existing alternative. Of course, this problem is aggravated by the possibility that there are simply few IOs in the democratizing state's geographic region. For example, democratization processes in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East have occurred against a background of relatively few effective IOs. In these circumstances, the feasibility of joining existing IOs, so as to promote reforms and/or enhance one's international reputation and democratic legitimacy, is questionable.

The Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) offers a nice illustration. As the socialist systems collapsed, newly elected governments in the postcommunist countries faced the daunting task of generating economic growth and meeting citizens' high expectations for improved well-being (Przeworski 1991; Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Hellman 1998). Since economic growth requires enhanced productivity, and since increased economic integration can improve productivity, the Visegrad countries issued the October 1991 Declaration of Cracow, which identified "an all-round development of relations with the European Community [as] the primary objective of their foreign policies."[11] But when the Central and Eastern European countries abandoned communist rule, "EU membership…seemed like a pipe dream rather than the tangible event it is today" (Dangerfield 2000:1). Not only was the attention of Germany—the European economic hegmon—focused on its own internal unification process, but the Eastern European countries were years from being able to comply with the totality of European law, the *acquis communautaire*. As Bakos (1993:1029) wrote in 1994, "Central European countries are not yet ready

to join …[they] need to shape their economies: to develop the market elements and to introduce compatible institutional structures."

What is more, the Central and Eastern European region had few extant organizations that could facilitate multilateral economic cooperation. The dense IO network in Western Europe was largely inaccessible to the new democracies in the east, and the few economic IOs that existed in Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War collapsed with the Soviet Union. With very few extant IOs on which to rely, the democratizing Central and Eastern European countries sought a new economic IO. Against this backdrop, on December 21, 1992, these countries signed the Cracow Treaty on the formation of the CEFTA, which aimed at helping the signatories "participate actively in the process of integration in Europe and…their preparedness to co-operate in seeking ways and means to strengthen the process."[12]

Dynamics: Stepping Stones

The example of CEFTA suggests that states sometimes form new IOs to create "stepping stones" toward eventual membership in the most lucrative existing IOs. Indeed, because immediate EU membership was not available, the Visegrad countries began multilateral trade liberalization among themselves. This generated immediate economic gains and sent "the correct signals to the main Western organisations coveted by postcommunist leaders" (Dangerfield 2000:2). Democratizing states may desire joining existing IOs once they begin to resemble established democracies (at which time they expect more benefits from existing IOs and are more readily able to gain access). This suggests path dependence in the relationship between democratization and international organization.[13] In the beginning, democratizing states have to form their own IOs because the existing institutional alternatives are neither fit nor feasible. Hence, democratization initially results in the creation of new IOs. However, this logic changes over time. As democratizing states form new IOs, and these IOs begin to support the democratic transition, democratizing states' needs and capabilities change. They begin to resemble established democracies. This means not only that democratizing states begin to view existing IOs as more fit to their changing problems, but also that democratizing states more easily gain access to the existing IOs. These two forces allow democratizing states to, over time, join existing IOs.

Such dynamics are difficult to test statistically, so our empirical analysis focuses on issues of fit and feasibility in the early years of democratization. However, examples of this process are numerous. In addition to the CEFTA, consider the Baltic Battalion. When Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia regained independence in September of 1991, they perceived a need to secure themselves against their former occupier—Russia. Membership in NATO was a key element of this strategy, as articulated by Raivo Vare, Estonian State Minister (responsible for defense): "The Soviet Union and Russians never keep their promises, the best solution would be direct military guarantees from the West…the only real possibility is NATO" (Lepik 2004:164).

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[10] Of course, the effect of democratization on the formation of new IOs depends on the availability of partners willing to form an IO. To account for this condition, the empirical analysis includes a variable capturing the number of IOs that other democratizing states in a region are forming. Controlling for this factor, we should see the democratization of a given state increase the probability that it forms an IO in a given year.

[11] Cited in Dangerfield (2000:25).

[12] Preamble of the Cracow Treaty, cited in Dangerfield (2000:41).

[13] For path dependence in general, see Pierson (2004). For applications to international relations, see March and Olsen (1998).

However, the Baltic foreign ministers recognized that immediate NATO membership was out of the question. Thus, in 1991, Jonas Gecas, Head of Staff of Voluntary Service of National Defence of Lithuania, offered a security path for the Baltic states: ''the first association will become among the Baltic states. The next union will likely be with the other states on the Baltic (Sea). The third step will be union with NATO'' (Lepik 2004, 165). Shortly thereafter, in 1993, Alexander Einseln, Commander of Estonian Defence Forces, broached the idea of a joint Baltic peacekeeping battalion at a meeting of the Baltic Defence Ministers.

Eventually, the Baltic Battalion did facilitate NATO membership. A few years after its creation, the leading Norwegian newspaper, *Aftenposten*, stated pejoratively: ''BALTBAT almost functions as a preparatory school for NATO membership'' (Lepik 2004:153). This view of BALTBAT was not only accurate, it was fully embraced by the Baltic states. According to the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence in 1999 (Lepik 2004:153),

> BALTBAT's objectives cover more than just peacekeeping operations. Plans approved by the BALTBAT Steering Group provide for the following tasks: to develop a force which is compatible and interoperable with NATO and to spread the BALTBAT experience into the rest of the national armed forces of the Baltic states…to increase the self-defence capability of the Baltic states.

Indeed, BALTBAT lasted only until September 2003. This was because the Baltic states were invited to start NATO membership talks in 2002 and gained NATO membership in March 2004.

Testable Implications

The most important empirical implication from our theory is that recent democratization should increase the probability a state participates in the formation of a new IO at any given time. If democratizing states seek external assistance for reform, but existing IOs are a poor fit and/or infeasible as institutional strategies, one would expect democratizing states, relative to all other states, to form new IOs.

Hypothesis 1: *All else constant, recent democratization increases the probability that a given state forms a new IO.*

Conversely, recent democratization should not increase the probability of joining existing IOs, because democratizing states are often unable to find suitable IOs and meet the conditions for membership. Joining existing IOs is a lucrative strategy, except that it suffers from a lack of feasibility. Therefore, while democratizing states may well join IOs, they should not do so at a higher rate than other states.

Hypothesis 2: *All else constant, recent democratization does not increase the probability that a given state joins an existing IO.*

To further scrutinize the argument, we also examine the types of IOs that democratizing states may be expected to join. Recall that democratizing states ultimately seek institutions that are fit to promote political and economic reforms in difficult conditions. Such political and economic reforms often require credible commitments (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Pevehouse 2005;

Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006). Given this, one would expect democratizing states to design their own IOs in a way that admits the enforcement of credible commitments. Following Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004) and Ingram, Robinson, and Busch (2005), the enforcement of credible commitments can be thought of as depending on the IO's institutionalization: Only highly institutionalized organizations are able to monitor and enforce policy, so we would expect democratizing states to form relatively highly institutionalized IOs among themselves. These highly institutionalized IOs may not be as effective as existing IOs with a proven track record, but the worst possible solution would be to form noninstitutionalized IOs.

Hypothesis 3: *Democratizing states are more likely to form new highly institutionalized IOs than new noninstitutionalized IOs.*

Empirical Analysis

Empirically evaluating our hypotheses on democratization and IO membership cannot be accomplished in a single test. The unit of analysis is the country-year from 1965 to 2000 (the years for which there is annual data on IO membership). Our tests seek to identify how *Democratization* influences the probability of country i joining or forming an IO at time t. With subscript k indexing the n control variables, our empirical models will have the following general functional form:

$$\Pr(Join/Form\ IO)_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Democratization_{i,t}$$
$$+ \sum_{k=1}^{n} \beta_k * Control_{k,i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \quad (1)$$

We begin by presenting the research design and results for our core tests. In these core tests, the dependent variable captures the decision to join an existing IO or form a new IO. Subsequent tests will disaggregate the dependent variable according to level of institutionalization.

Dependent Variables

We construct two binary dependent variables. The first, *Join Existing*, equals 1 if a state joined in year t an IO that was created prior to year t, 0 otherwise. The second, *Form New*, equals 1 if a state joined in year t an IO that was also formed in year t, 0 otherwise.

We use binary dependent variables for two reasons. First, they capture our concept of interest: Did the democratizing state decide to participate in forming a new IO or not? Did the democratizing state decide to join an existing IO or not? Second, there are few instances in which states form or join more than one IO at a time. In fact, for both forming and joining IOs, the vast majority of the observations are either zero or one (71% for joining and 94% for forming).[14]

Key Independent Variables

Our key independent variable, *Democratization*, is a binary variable that equals 1 if the −10 to 10 Polity IV score (Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010) of state i changes from below 6 in year $t − 5$ to

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[14] We re-ran our analysis using a negative binomial model. It produced results consistent with the analysis presented here. The results for these count models can be found in the supplementary appendix.

above or equal to 6 in year t.[15] This specification captures all political transitions that make a country a democracy, as indicated by competitive elections and institutional constraints on the executive's authority. Below, we conduct robustness checks with longer lags.

In the main analysis, we compare the effect of democratization against the baseline of *all* other states. However, the results also hold if the baseline is an autocracy or an established democracy, as we show in the supplementary appendix. In other words, democratizing states form new IOs at a higher rate than both autocracies and established democracies.

Control Variables

It is important to account for variables that may confound the relationship between democratization and joining or forming an IO. We therefore include a number of control variables.[16] For summary statistics, see the supplementary appendix.

First, we suspect that the decision of a state to join or form an IO will be, in part, a function of the number of IOs to which the state already belongs. Therefore, we include a variable that measures the number of total IOs in which state i is a member in year t.

Second, we include a number of other variables drawn from Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008). The variable *Year* simply indicates the year of the observation. This allows us to account for possible temporal trends. *Former Communist* is coded 1 for states that previously had communist governments, beginning in the first year after communist rule. One may suspect that states in the Soviet bloc had unusually strong reasons to form or join new organizations, given that the international institutions established by the Soviet Union had recently collapsed. Since recently independent states may have a stronger need to become IO members, the variable *Independence* is the number of years state i has been an independent nation-state as of year t. Finally, Mansfield and Pevehouse include a variety of dummy variables capturing a state's

geographic region. We also include these region dummies so as to account for regional heterogeneity not captured by our other variables.

Third, we include two variables that capture important global or regional trends. The first, *Number of IOs Globally*, accounts for the trend of increasing international institutionalization over time (Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996). This variable helps guard against conflating the effect of democratization with the effect of a general tendency toward increased international institutionalization. The second, *Democratizing States Spatial Lag*, captures spatial interdependence in our model. This variable accounts for the possibility that state i's decision to democratize is influenced by the existence of other democratizing states and that a democratizing state i's decision to join or form an IO could be influenced by other democratizing states joining or forming an IO.[17] The inclusion of such a spatial lag term has become common practice in studies of policy diffusion because it provides a way to estimate the strength of interdependence that is relatively simple compared to spatial maximum likelihood and spatial two stage least squares.[18]

Results

Since the dependent variable is binary, we estimate the model using logit regression with standard errors clustered on the country. Table 1 reports the results.[19] For each specification, democratization within the last 5 years has a statistically significant association with the probability that a country forms a new IO. This finding holds without control variables (Model 1), with control variables (Model 2), and with the inclusion of the two trend variables (Model 3). In contrast, democratization has no association with the probability that a state joins an existing IO. Without control variables, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant (Model 4). But as soon as we introduce control variables, the coefficient shrinks and loses statistical significance (Model 5). This is also the case when we include the additional control variables (Model 6).

To present the substantive effects, we compute the relative risk associated with democratization in relation to forming a new IO. Since the logit is a nonlinear regression model, one means of substantively interpreting the

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[15] There is no standard in international relations for when a state should be considered a democracy on the Polity scale. For example, some studies use a rather conservative measure of polity ≥7 (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008), while others adopt a more generous coding of polity ≥5 (Lai and Reiter 2000; Gibler 2008). We followed Jaggers and Gurr (1995) and Marshall et al. (2010) by using the middle of these two options.

[16] In their study of democratization and IO formation, Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) include several additional variables that we omit because these variables are either highly collinear with the variables already in our model or because they do not, in actuality, capture a variable that confounds the relationship between democratization and joining/forming an IO. The supplemental analysis packet contains results from models that include these variables, and the results are nearly identical to our main models.

The variables highly collinear with those in the model include *Autocratization* (a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the Polity IV score of state i changes from above −7 to below or equal to −7 between years $t − 5$ and t, or if the Polity IV score of state i changes from above or equal to 7 to below 7 between years $t − 5$ and t, zero otherwise) and *Stable Democracy* (which equals 1 if state i remains democratic between years $t − 5$ and t, zero otherwise). Those that we do not think confound the relationship between democratization and IOs are *Major Power* (a dichotomous variable coded 1 if state i is considered a great power in year t), *Dispute* (the number of militarized interstate disputes involving state i that are ongoing in year t), and *Hegemony* (the relative size of the largest state in the international system, calculated using GDP data). Based on the history of COW-identified major powers, being a major power does not appear to impact whether or not a state is a democracy. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008) mention how hegemonic states may provide the resources to enable IOs to properly function, but it is unclear how hegemonic states, by themselves, relate to democratization. With respect to disputes, though we think the relationship is tenuous, one could argue that states become involved in a high number of militarized disputes for the purpose of avoiding democratization (as a type of diversionary war), while military conflict might prevent states from becoming members of IOs.

[17] To create this variable, we begin by computing a weighting matrix, $\mathbf{W}_t$, which is an N by N connectivity matrix that captures the influence of state i on state j. $w_{i,j,t}$ is the jth element in row i and is coded 1 if i and j are democratizing states in the same COW geographic region, 0 otherwise. Next, we multiply this matrix by the values of the dependent variable in period t, y_t. Finally, we include $w_{i,t−1} \, y_{t−1}$ as a control variable when estimating country i in period t, where the spatial lags are lagged by 1 year to mitigate the simultaneity bias in the estimation. Stated more directly, the assumption is that outcomes in country i are influenced by outcomes in other, connected countries after a one-period time lag.

[18] See Franzese and Hays (2006, 2008) for examples of spatial maximum likelihood and spatial two-stage least squares. Cao and Prakash (2010) make clear that including the spatial lag term as a control variable requires making the rather strong assumption that there are no instantaneous effects between the dependent variable and the variable of interest. Such an assumption is defensible in our case. We do not believe that joining (forming) an IO will itself cause a state to democratize, nor do we believe that other democratizing states joining (forming) IOs will cause another state to democratize (though IOs could facilitate the *consolidation* of democratic governance, as Pevehouse 2005, has argued). Instead, we only think that it is important to account for the possibility that democratizing states joining (forming) an IO could induce another democratizing state to join (form) an IO.

[19] Our model is for hypothesis testing, not prediction. Nevertheless, we find that our model correctly predicts 83% of the formations and 85% of the joinings. These statistics are found in the supplementary appendix.

TABLE 1. Forming a New International Organization (IO) Versus Joining an Existing IO, Logit Results

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Form a New IO			Join an Existing IO		
Democratization	0.36 (0.15)**	0.41 (0.17)**	0.36 (0.18)**	0.36 (0.16)**	0.01 (0.15)	−0.05 (0.15)
Control Variables						
Number of IOs state i is a Member		0.04 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.00)***		0.03 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***
North America		−0.37 (0.10)***	−0.30 (0.11)***		−0.35 (0.17)**	−0.34 (0.18)*
South America		−0.50 (0.11)***	−0.48 (0.12)***		−0.08 (0.12)	− 0.05 (0.12)
Asia		−0.58 (0.09)***	−0.58 (0.09)***		−0.32 (0.12)***	−0.33 (0.13)**
Oceania		−0.73 (0.09)***	−0.59 (0.14)***		0.02 (0.27)	0.01 (0.25)
Europe		−0.77 (0.10)***	−0.77 (0.11)***		−0.76 (0.11)***	−0.76 (0.12)***
Middle East		−0.59 (0.10)***	−0.59 (0.10)***		−0.30 (0.11)***	−0.31 (0.11)***
Former Communist		0.87 (0.15)***	1.19 (0.16)***		1.58 (0.16)***	2.09 (0.19)***
Independence		−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)		−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Year		−0.06 (0.00)***	−0.23 (0.01)***		0.01 (0.00)**	− 0.07 (0.01)***
Number of IOs Globally			0.02 (0.00)***			0.01 (0.00)***
Democratizing States Spatial Lag			−2.21 (0.93)**			0.18 (0.70)
Constant	−0.89 (0.05)***	107.78 (8.02)***	451.82 (17.18)***	0.40 (0.04)***	−17.62 (7.87)**	143.86 (19.58)***
Number of Observations	5,136	5,136	4,971	5,136	5,136	4,971

(Note. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.)

coefficients is with predicted probabilities. However, the rare occurrence of many international events will render the predicted probabilities to be exceedingly small. An alternative means of substantively interpreting logit model coefficients is to use odds ratios, where one can compute the exponential value of the coefficients and then interpret the coefficients as the odds of one event compared to a base-line event. In contrast to the odds ratio, Bennett and Stam (2004:67–69) suggest using the relative risk to substantively evaluate logit coefficients. More precisely, if we are interested in the effect on IO membership when some variable X changes from *value 1* to *value 2*, we can compute the following equation:

$$\frac{\text{Pr}(\textit{Form IO}|X = \textit{value 2})}{\text{Pr}(\textit{Form IO}|X = \textit{value 1})} \qquad (2)$$

For example, a relative risk of 1.24 suggests that increasing variable X from value 1 to value 2 will increase the probability of forming an IO by 24%. In contrast, a relative risk of 0.9 suggests that increasing variable X from *value 1* to *value 2* will decrease the probability of forming an IO by 10%. Returning to our results, we use the model from column 3 to find that democratization increases the probability of forming an IO by 25% (relative risk of 1.25).[20]

As for the control variables, we note that the global number of IOs has a highly significant and positive association with forming and joining IOs. This suggests that its inclusion in the model is warranted. In contrast, the spatial lag term has a highly significant and negative association with forming and no association with joining IOs. Interestingly, the decisions of other democratizing states to form IOs seems to impede IO formation in the same region. One possible explanation is that if a democratizing state sees other states forming IOs, it can avoid the costs of IO creation by later joinining these IOs, which were probably created to address problems relevant to democratizing states in that region. Moreover, this find-

ing indicates that regional democratization trends are not driving the association between democratization and IO formation.

It is worth briefly discussing the coefficients on the regional dummy variables. In the formation models of Table 1, the signs on these variables are all negative and statistically significant. Since Africa is the base category, this suggests that African countries are more likely, relative to all other regions of countries, to form an IO. One plausible explanation is the relative paucity of older African IOs due to the region's colonial past. In contrast, the signs on the regional dummy variables in the joining models suggest that countries in South America and Oceania are no more or less likely to join an IO compared to African countries.

Robustness Checks

To boost confidence in these findings, we conduct several additional tests whose results are available in the supplementary appendix.[21] First, one may suspect that the decision to join (form) an IO at time t is temporally related to the decision to join (form) an IO at time $t − 1$. To account for such temporal interdependence, we re-run each model with the inclusion of cublic splines that are knotted at the decision to join (form) an IO, along with a variable indicating the time between IO joinings (formations) for a particular country (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). Including these variables leaves our key results unchanged.

Second, one might be concerned that our results are driven by former communist countries in Eastern Europe. Therefore, we reestimate the models with European countries from the Soviet bloc removed from the sample. Since these observations are highly co-linear with the *Former Commmunist* variable, we also remove this variable from the model. The sign on the *Democratization* variable remains positive and significant when IO formation is the

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[20] STATA do files for computing the relative risk are available in a replication packet.

[21] In addition to the results reported here, we also conduct a test in which the independent variables are all lagged by 1 year. Results reported in the supplemental analysis packet show that this has little impact on our results.

dependent variable and is statistically insignificant when joining an IO is the dependent variable. This suggests that our results are not being driven by the presence of the East Bloc European Countries.

Third, recall that the *Democratization* variable equals 1 if the Polity IV score of state *i* changed from below 6 to above or equal to 6 between years *t* − 5 and *t*. Therefore, we reanalyze the main results by recoding the time lag for the *Democratization* variable. Specifically, we begin by allowing *Democratization* to equal 1 if the Polity IV score of state *i* changes from below 6 to above or equal to 6 between years *t* − 2 and *t*. We then reconduct the analysis by adding an additional year to the time lag (that is, allowing *Democratization* to equal 1 if the Polity IV score of state *i* changes from below 6 to above or equal to 6 between years *t* − 3 and *t*). We repeat this reanalysis until the time lag takes the measurement from years *t* − 10 and *t*. We find that our results hold until the lag reaches 8 years. At this point, the *Democratization* variable is statistically insignificant when the dependent variable captures IO formation.

Fourth, wealth is recognized as a determinant of democracy, and democracy, in turn, influences wealth (Przewroski and Limongi 1993; Londregan and Poole 1996; Boix and Stokes 2003; Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, and O' Halloran 2006). Moreover, since several IOs focus on poverty alleviation, the decision to join/form an IO could also be driven by wealth. Therefore, we control for a country's level of wealth using World Bank GDP per capita data. The inclusion of this variable leaves our results unchanged.

Finally, we consider if the effect of democratization varies from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period. The analysis shows that the effect of democratization on the formation of new IOs is driven by the post-Cold War period. This makes intuitive sense given the third wave of democratization and the increasing importance of IOs since the demise of the Soviet Union. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the number of democratic transitions increased across the world. This coincided with the end of the Cold War, an event that created excitement and opportunities for international cooperation. Therefore, it is not surprising that the association between democratization and IO formation is essentially a post-Cold War phenomenon.

Disaggregation by Institutionalization

The above results lend empirical support to our first two hypotheses. We now investigate Hypothesis 3, which pertains to the levels of institutionalization characterizing organizations formed by democratizing states. Do democratizing states form highly institutionalized organizations capable of enforcing commitments, or do they form minimally institutionalized paper tigers? To foreshadow, we find that the positive effect of democratization on IO formation is driven by highly institutionalized organizations capable of enforcing credible commitments. This suggests that the rationale for forming new IOs is related to the issue of credible commitment emphasized by Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006). It appears that democratizing states try to enforce credible commitments on their own, because they are unable to use the more effective existing IOs for this purpose.

We draw from the Ingram et al. (2005) coding of IO institutionalization, which is based on coding rules from Boehmer et al. (2004). These variables capture the level of

institutionalization in the IOs that states form and join. Some organizations are minimally institutionalized and thus unable to enforce policies or constrain state behavior (for example, African Civil Society Observatory); others are moderately institutionalized or possess administrative capacity but not the ability to enforce policy (for example, European Space Agency); yet others are highly institutionalized and thus can enforce policies (for example, NATO).

The first dependent variable equals 1 in year *t* if state *i* joined an existing IO with a low level of institutionalization, zero otherwise. The second dependent variable equals 1 in year *t* if state *i* joined an existing IO with a medium level of institutionalization. The third dependent variable equals 1 in year *t* if state *i* joined an existing IO with a high level of institutionalization. The fourth dependent variable equals 1 in year *t* if state *i* formed a new IO with a low level of institutionalization. The fifth dependent variable equals 1 in year *t* if state *i* formed a new IO with a medium level of institutionalization. The sixth dependent variable equals 1 in year *t* if state *i* formed a new IO with a high level of institutionalization.[22]

The results are shown in Table 2. For high levels of institutionalization, democratization has a statistically significant and positive effect on the probability of forming a new IO. Since highly institutionalized IOs can enforce policies, this suggests that democratizing states form new IOs to create credible commitments. By contrast, for joining existing IOs, the effect is always statistically indistinguishable from zero. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, these findings indicate that democratizing states form new IOs as substitutes for joining existing IOs that could enforce policy.

Conclusion

The existing literature presumes that democratizing states join existing IOs to make credible commitments to political-economic reforms (Moravcsik 2000; Pevehouse 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006). We challenge this view. We argue that democratization leads states not to *join* existing IOs, but to instead *form* their own IOs. Democratizing states seek to maximize the ''fit'' between the potential institutional solution and the problem at hand (Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal 2013). Existing IOs are often a poor fit because established democracies created them to solve problems other than creating institutional capacity for the provision of public goods and the implementation of policy reforms. Moreover, democratizing states must consider the ''feasibility'' of existing institutional solutions. Joining existing IOs is often not feasible for democratizing states as, for instance, some regions of the world have a low number of suitable IOs. Given the twin difficulties of fit and feasibility, democratizing states rely on the formation of new IOs.

The joining versus forming distinction compels not only a rethinking of the democratization and IO relationship, but the study of international cooperation more broadly. First, while institutional design and states' subsequent decisions to join IOs have mostly been studied in

[22] One might be concerned that the same country in the same year could receive a score of 1 for both low institutionalization and high institutionalization. Therefore, we conduct a series of additional tests where each of the above-described variables is coded 1 only when a country joins/forms an organization of the desired level of institutionalization and did not join/form an international organization of an alternative level of institutionalization. The results are similar to those reported in the text and are available in the supplemental analysis packet.

TABLE 2. Forming a New International Organization (IO) Versus Joining an Existing IO, by Institutionalization

Join or Form	Join			Form		
Level of Institutionalization	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
Democratization	0.13 (0.26)	−0.03 (0.14)	−0.10 (0.12)	0.44 (0.24)*	0.11 (0.21)	0.13 (0.18)
Control Variables						
Number of IOs state *i* is a Member	−0.01 (0.00)**	0.01 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.00)***
North America	−0.77 (0.31)**	−0.17 (0.13)	−0.31 (0.13)**	−0.27 (0.23)	−0.07 (0.18)	−0.41 (0.19)**
South America	−0.38 (0.26)	0.01 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	−0.68 (0.20)***	−0.26 (0.15)*	−0.47 (0.16)***
Asia	−0.39 (0.22)*	−0.25 (0.11)**	−0.34 (0.11)***	−0.88 (0.20)***	−0.16 (0.10)*	−0.52 (0.11)***
Oceania	0.43 (0.27)	−0.11 (0.19)	−0.15 (0.11)	−0.77 (0.65)	−0.35 (0.20)*	−0.28 (0.23)
Europe	0.38 (0.19)**	−0.55 (0.12)***	−0.63 (0.09)***	−0.57 (0.18)***	−0.24 (0.11)**	−0.98 (0.17)***
Middle East	−0.04 (0.22)	−0.26 (0.10)***	−0.10 (0.08)	−0.19 (0.17)	−0.41 (0.12)***	−0.52 (0.12)***
Former Communist	1.62 (0.26)***	1.63 (0.17)***	1.37 (0.16)***	−0.32 (0.36)	0.77 (0.23)***	1.73 (0.22)***
Independence	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Year	−0.05 (0.02)**	−0.07 (0.01)***	−0.06 (0.01)***	−0.29 (0.05)***	−0.16 (0.01)***	−0.24 (0.02)***
Number of IOs Globally	0.00 (0.00)*	0.01 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.01)***	0.01 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.00)***
Democratizing States Spatial Lag	0.57 (1.33)	1.03 (0.89)	−0.03 (0.84)	−0.57 (2.78)	0.54 (0.60)	−5.67 (2.68)**
Constant	88.14 (41.41)**	143.23 (22.09)***	112.67 (20.15)***	565.41 (95.34)***	309.62 (20.95)***	478.85 (30.21)***
Number of Observations	4,971	4,971	4,971	4,971	4,971	4,971

(*Note.* *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.)

isolation, this practice can produce invalid conclusions. Forming and joining are alternative strategies of international cooperation. Theories of institutional design should account for the context of IO creation and investigate the availability of existing IOs that allow cooperation.

Second, the joining versus forming distinction can help explain the profusion of IOs. Why are so many IOs created? What determines the growth of IO creation? If our argument is correct, so that domestic political changes induce states to create new IOs, then it may explain the rapid expansion of the IO universe. Additionally, our theory provides testable hypotheses regarding the conditions that impede or enable IO proliferation. In particular, we expect new IOs to emerge in response to political changes that create distinct cooperation problems for new states.

Our theory on the origins of new IOs may also help scholars understand the long-run effects of IOs. If IOs are created in response to specific problems, yet their institutional features are durable and subject to path dependence, then the origins of IOs will have important effects on the outcomes they produce in the future. For example, when and how can IOs facilitate democratic consolidation (Pevehouse 2005)? A large body of literature has emerged on the effects of IO membership on economic policy (Cao 2009), international conflict (Boehmer et al. 2004), and member interests (Bearce and Bondanella 2007). If IOs are created to address distinct problems in specific contexts, their origins should partly explain these and many other outcomes.

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